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I. INTRODUCTION
The  development  of  Humanoid  robots  in  Societies  asks  many  questions  in  regard  of  their
acceptance  and  their  utility.  Because  of  their  realistic  appearance  but  of  their  relatively  poor
capabilities to interact either physically or socially with persons, humanoid robots are at best rigid
machines  fully  controllable  and  predictable  but  only  in  constrained  environments,  at  worse
fascinating  automata  that  are  mostly  unpredictable  or  risky  to  manipulate  due  to  their  poor
capacities  of  coordination  and  of  adaptation  in  unconstrained  environments.  The  usefulness  of
humanoid robots is still unclear at a short term but progresses in Artificial Intelligence appear an
ineluctable movement in the long term to have more autonomous behaviors and more adaptivity.
The question of ethics in robots is therefore legitimate as far as they will be in contact with persons.
As any new technology, their introduction let no ones indifferent and carries many reactions (and
fantasies) either over-pessimistic or over-optimistic about their real capabilities and potential risks.
The types of interaction we may have can be ranged from unpredictable, unpleasant and frustrating
interactions,  to  adaptive,  unrepetitive  and  pleasant  behaviors  but  how  to  know  in  advance  if
interacting wit these advanced toys can be a source of emancipation for us or a source of alienation?
Everything cannot be anticipated but this may depend on person’s mood, on the robot’s use and
purpose, but also on how they are designed. The development of Digital Technologies (Computers,
Cell Phones and Internet) might be representative of how the robot business and its norms will
evolve and be regulated in the future. Internet has already changed the way we communicate and
the way we work.
It has changed also the manner we organize our social life and the delimitation of our sphere of
privacy. As similar with other technologies, it is probable that a regulation at the society level will
occur  for  robots  in  homes.  For  instance,  as  robots  come to our  houses,  they  can  collect  more
detailed information about our habits than any other technologies can do, nonetheless the question
of privacy is not yet asked and answered. And as different from other technologies, robots have the
possibility to act almost autonomously in the physical and digital environment. As their body may
resemble too much those of humans and their actions may appear intentional, they may generate
also some troubles or injuries to persons in contact with, especially to persons not accustomed to
like infants and the elderly people. Furthermore, as it is for video games, the sci-fi literature and the
movies industry have popularized the idea that we will confuse ourselves and mix between reality
and fiction concerning robots and that we will not be able to make any distinction with humans in
the future. This is however not new and not specific to robots.
René Girard theorized it as the Mimesis or as the Mimetic Desire, this human trait by which we
project to  others our own emotions,  desire and intentions  (Girard,  1976, 1977).  Girard had the
insight that our autonomy is ’illusory’ and our desires are always borrowed from the others. As
Human Beings are always trapped into Mimesis, they are at the same time attracted to and repulsed
by what resemble us and imitate us. In this state of mutual mimicry, it is difficult to understand who
is the initiator and who is the imitator as the distance between the two vanishes. In the light of the
Mimesis theory, humanoid robots and AI are our modern mirrors in which we project our fantasies.
We would like however  to  see  in  robots  a  more  positive  trend.  As AI is  a  model  of  our  own
intelligence, these algorithms can serve at the end to understand us better, to gauge our limits and to
help us to elevate our potentialities either physical or cognitive. They can be an opportunity for
improving our learning capabilities and for assisting us in our daily life. As if we were in front of a
new type of mirror, robots are reflective machines that ask us how we would define intelligence for
ourselves or how we would like to see others to interact with us; it might serve to interrogate our
own ethics. As robots can learn and improve their behaviors through interaction, they may at the
end resemble us more, mimic our behaviors and learn our habits and our social rules; our bias and
taboos.
More than any other machines, they may enhance our learning of things as we possess powerful
implicit learning mechanisms that are affected by social interaction (Marshal & Meltzoff, 2015). We
will develop in the following the question of the robot ethics in interaction with persons and to what
extent ethical behaviors can be either coded or learned within one autonomous system. Robot Ethics
is now an interdisciplinary research at the intersection of applied ethics and robotics. We would like
to extend it to what is known in regard to human brain learning and infant development.
Embodiment – The way engineers conceive Intelligence as a direct  consequence on how they
design ’intelligent’ behaviors in robots. This has at the end some impact on the robots’ actions and
interactions and therefore on its ethics. We think that Intelligence is not about the accumulation of
data as a metaphor of a Storehouse or of the Computer but its about perceiving and deciding what
that  data  means.  And meaningful  data  cannot  be  dissociated  from the  physical  support  of  this
information: following Shannon theory of information, information has a physical reality. Since any
knowledge is acquired only from the perceptual experiences we have within the environment, one
key idea we would like to advance is that the Body is the support vector for developing meaningful
information and Intelligence. The other is that information is obviously limited, incomplete, but also
subjective. We think therefore that Embodied Intelligence (or Embodiment) is a prerequisite design
principle for any agent to acquire any intelligent behaviors like ethical behaviors; see (Pfeifer &
Scheier, 1999; Pfeifer & Bongard, 2006; Pfeifer & Pitti, 2012).
This proposal might be obvious or simplistic but it is only through the body that one agent can
experience oneself, and others. One consequence is that we can see the Body as the medium by
which a sense of Active Perception can be acquired. Active Perception is the ability to learn to
predict and anticipate the future sensory outcomes of one’s own actions and possibly those of others
(Clark, 2015). This is at least what it is seen in infant cognitive development. Studies by Andrew
Meltzoff and Jacqueline Nadel discovered how imitation is deeply rooten in our genes as infants
learn culturally by imitating others starting even at birth; see (Nadel & Butterworth, 1999) and
(Meltzoff  & Decety,  2003).  Andrew Meltzoff  extended  this  idea  and  developed  one  paradigm
known as the “like me” hypothesis saying that infants understand others actions as if they were
“like them” through their own repertoire of actions acquired by embodiment (Meltzoff, 2007). By
doing so, they can mentalize others intention through observation of their actions in the light of
their owns and even at an early age. This proposal is an interesting working hypothesis to develop
in robots to endow them with cognitive capabilities in order to understand humans intention through
their bodies as if they were “like them”. As one acquires more experiences about oneself and others,
it  can acquire  a sense of what  is  Self  and what  is  Others,  which is  one way to apprehend the
question of Ethics.
We will  see  in  other  sections  how Embodied  Intelligence  is  linked  to  the  way information  is
acquired  and  represented  in  the  brain  regions  related  to  Agency,  Self-Other  representations,
Empathy, Theory of Minds with the so-called Mirror Neurons System and how it has an impact on
the way roboticists may design cognitive architectures in robots for ethical behaviors.
This  digression  on  Embodiment  was  important  to  explain  our  approach  and  to  emphasize  the
difference between what is called the weak AI, the idea that intelligent behaviors generated in a
robot  are simulated and handcrafted by engineers and strong AI,  the idea that  some aspects of
intelligent behaviors can be learned and tested through the robot’s own perceptual experiences. We
believe that  engineers should not  code directly  any abstract rules (e.g.  ethical rules)  within the
robot’s  memory  system  like  we  would  do  in  a  computer’s  program  and  for  old-fashion  AI
algorithms  (including  feed-forward  algorithms  like  deep  networks),  because  any  situation  is
experienced through the bodily senses and should be learned in consequence through its specific
sensorimotor connections. Because brain and body dynamics are so intricate, the embodied brain is
open-ended, always in interaction within the environment whereas the computer is a closed system,
working in abstract symbolic worlds outside of the physical reality (Lungarella & Sporns, 2005).
Therefore the two strategies for computing information are different. 
The way information is processed by the brain is distributed, asynchronous, analog and robust to
noise; the complete opposite is true for computers in which information processing is centralized,
synchronous, digital, symbolic and very sensitive to errors. Since the body serves as the interface
from which  any perceptual  inference  can  be made,  any robot  anchors  its  perceptual  memories
transcribed into the ’language’ spoken by its sensorimotor circuits. We believe that any formulation
of ethical behaviors in robots should be written at the sensorimotor level through embodiment and
not at a symbolic level.
Development & Learning – This difference between closed systems and open systems is important
as far as we design active robots and as far as humans are in the loop. In line with Cybernetics
(Wiener, 1948), Edgar Morin explains that what characterizes Complex Systems is their capabilities
to organize their own behaviors through their actions, and by doing so, their actions modify their
internal organizations (Morin & Le Moigne, 1999). This reflexivity of open-ended processes based
on feedback is what makes any system adaptive and robust to variations. If any action for a robot
may always introduce noise and randomicity,  it  gives  rise also to  new phenomenons proper  to
dynamical  systems  such  as  Emergence  and  Self-Organization  important  for  adaptiveness  and
creativity.
If inter-acting is open-ended and not close, all situations are potentially novel. It is a co-constructive
process as it changes oneself and others during time. This requires therefore some adaptive learning
system to learn to anticipate and understand others’ intention. Following this, according to Morin,
any knowledge should conceive some subjectivity related to the observation of others to apprehend
any ethical problem:
“Toute connaissance (et conscience) qui ne peut concevoir l’individualité, la subjectivité, qui ne
peut inclure l’observateur dans son observation, est infirme pour penser tous problèmes, surtout les
problèmes éthiques. Elle peut être efficace pour la domination des objets matériels, le contraire des
énèrgies et les manipulations sur le vivant.  Mais elle est  devenue myope pour appréhender les
réalités  humaines  et  elle  devient  une  menace  pour  l’avenir  humain.” Morin,  E.,  Ethique  (La
méthode 6), Seuil, 2004, p. 65.
We think that this kind of reflexivity based on feedback is to what any autonomous learning systems
have to tend to in order to transcribe information into a knowledge. As intrinsic noise and error are
constitutive to any interaction with the environment even for robots, error-driven adaptation –or
what is called reinforcement learning– may lead to more robust behaviors and to the detection of
novel or unpredictable situations. Thinking about how agents evolve in a dynamical environment
can help to design autonomous systems that can deal with uncertainties and with the unexpected.
Hence, open-ended agents should display properties of learning by trial and errors in order to test
situations  from  their  actions.  Following  Alan  Turing’s  proposal,  any  robot  should  learn
incrementally just  like a child does by interacting with humans through trial and errors and by
imitation (Turing, 1950). In line with him, we propose to not code any rules into robots but make
them to experience and learn ethical rules through interactions with persons as a developmental
process. That is, for us ethics should be a result of the robot’s own development and interactions
with  others  and  not  something  coded  abstractly,  separately  programmed  from  the  rest  of  its
sensorimotor decision making system as it  would be for one pluggable module.  Developmental
learning should lead therefore to adaptive behaviors for which ethics is one aspect, embodied and
intertwined with its own actions and comprehension of the scene.
“Instead of  trying to  produce a programme to  simulate  the  adult  mind,  why not  rather  try  to
produce one which simulates the child’s? If this were then subjected to an appropriate course of
education, one would obtain the adult brain [...] Our hope is that there is so little mechanism in the
child brain that something like it can be easily programmed. The amount of work in the education
we can assume, as a first approximation, to be much the same as for the human child.”  (Turing,
1950, pp.456)
This idea is at the ground of Developmental Robotics whose main goal is to model the development
of increasingly complex cognitive processes in natural and artificial systems and to understand how
such processes emerge through physical and social interaction (Asada & al.  2001; Metta & al.,
2003). This approach sees the whole body as a unified computational machine in order to learn
from actions any perceptual experiences including interacting with others. This objective relies on
the discovery of the Mirror Neurons System within the brain (Rizzolatti & al., 2001), which puts a
strong  role  on  multimodal  integration  and  sensorimotor  integration  for  Agency  and  to  the
development  of  a  Theory  of  Mind  in  infants  (Gallese,  2005).  Researchers  in  Developmental
Robotics  would  like  to  replicate  these  cognitive  architectures  in  robots  to  benefit  from  these
possibilities (Kuniyoshi, 2014; Cangelosi & Schesinger, 2015). For instance, the roboticist Minoru
Asada proposed a  developmental  scenario  how ethical  values  like  empathy can  be  shared  and
learned within a robot by developing a sense of Self linked to Others (Asada, 2015). At the root of
any of these cognitive architectures, still speculative, is the capability to predict the consequences of
oneself actions (Asada et al., 2011).
Active Inference – Being embodied implies to rely on timing of events, sensorimotor coordination,
on  perceiving  that  our  own actions  have  some impacts  in  the  world.  Since  every  situation  is
different and depends on a context, learning in which state the robot is and adapting its plan in
consequence,  with respect to the current context or goal,  is  an important feature to endow any
autonomous  system.  Similar  to  infants,  this  ability  of  ’self-calibration’  as  expressed  by  the
researcher in cognitive development Philippe Rochat is crucial for realizing intelligent behaviors in
robots and to develop in them a sense of control (Rochat, 2003, 2011). This sense of control on
things or of agency gives in return more predictability to persons in interaction with and a sense of
comfort as the machine behaves as expected. Agency or Self-judgment is based on error prediction
signals that assess current sensory activity based on the brain’s expectations. According to it, the
brain is continuously attempting to minimize the discrepancy or prediction error in order to adapt
itself to the current situation, and this corresponds to the feeling of Agency or Awareness.
This capability of the brain for coding prediction (Predictive Coding) is however important for
scene comprehension, reading one mind, as well as for Self representation and also for interacting
with others. Recently, many researchers are defending this idea, like Andy Clark (Clark, 2015), Karl
Friston and others (Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Apps & Tsakiris, 2014). In so far, no robot can even
roughly recognize a scene, itself on a mirror, grasp satisfyingly  an object, understanding where its
own hand is or learning to predict others’ intention.
Self-Other Brain Regions, the Mirror Neurons – According to Anil Seth, the Self network in the
human brain may learn interoceptive signals by infering hidden causes (active inference) as well as
errors (error-learning) when they can(not) be predicted (Seth, 2013). Seth identified the Anterior
Insular Cortex (AIC) as this comparator circuit to be engaged in interoceptive inference, which is
useful for error learning for this Self Network. By extension, it is proposed that the comparator
circuit  in AIC may exhibit  the development of a  network for a Theory of Mind (mind-reading
capability) using also predictive coding and error-learning but for exteroceptive inference (Frith &
Frith, 2003). Through embodied interactions, we suggest that what we might think as high-level
abstract rules (e.g., ethical rules) can be learned and created at a very low-level by imitating robots
endowed with such cognitive architecture and based on predictive coding.
Other  candidates  brain  regions  have  been  investigated  by  neuroscientists  for  mind-reading
capabilities,  like the so-called Mirror Neurons system, which has been extensively modeled by
developmental roboticists. The MNS is placed in the shared circuits in the monkey and the humans
parietal, in the temporal and motor areas formed from reciprocal and anatomical connections that
work in parallel for transforming sensorimotor information (Ferrari & al., 2009; Murata & Ishida,
2007). Although their primary functions are aimed at interacting in the physical world by processing
the multimodal sensory information about objects  into motor commands, modern neurosciences
attribute them a far broader role to engage oneself into the social world.
The principal evidence comes from the finding by Rizzolatti and colleagues of a particular class of
neurons in the monkey F5 motor area, which is firing both when the monkey executes one action
and when he is observing someone else executing it (Rizzolatti, & al. 1996; Gallese et al., 1996).
The metaphor of a mirroring mechanism between the sensory and motor apparatus for generating
one action and for understanding those of others has been retained to name this special class of
neurons found primarily in the motor circuits and then in the parietal cortex (Keysers, 2004; Gallese
et  al.,  2004).  These  mirror  neurons  are  multimodal  neurons  that  merge  signals  from  visual,
proprioceptive, auditory and somatopic systems (Sakata, et al. 1997; Caggiano et al., 2009). Some
of them (in the Ventral Intra-Parietal area) are involved in the representation of the space within
reach, the peripersonal space, which encodes a body image at the skin surface aimed at locating the
relative  position  of  the  body-parts  and  of  the  objects  nearby  in  body-centered  coordinates
(Rizzolatti et al., 1997).
By extension, these mirror-like neurons describe not only how the body interacts physically in the
environment but also how the bodily-self binds socially with others. These features of the mirror
neurons (MN) have deep implications as they may furnish some grounds on how higher cognitive
skills could have arisen from the neural extent of the body representation itself as it is argued for
empathy (Decety & Sommerville, 2007; Decety & Jackson, 2004; Bufalari et al., 2007), theory of
mind (Fogassi et al., 2005; Fujii et al., 2008), the roots of language (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998) and
even corporeal awareness (Keysers & Gazzola, 2006; Rizzolatti & Fabbri-Destro, 2008).
There are therefore of some interests for modeling the features of these brain structures in robots,
which may serve for supporting ethical behaviors.
Explanatory Learning  Algorithms –  Predictive  Coding  is  an  interesting  paradigm for  ethical
robots  because it  has  its  roots  with Bayesian Inference.  Bayesian theory is  used to  update the
probability  for  a  hypothesis  as  more  evidence  or  information  becomes  available.  Under  this
framework, one robot may update its current hypothesis about the current states or context based on
its incoming signals or based on its own actions in the environment. Any error or conflicts may
update its self-judgment about this hypothesis, which may in return be explained further to one user.
After all,  it  is only when we can explain something clearly to someone that we have a perfect
understanding  of  it.  This  goes  in  the  direction  of  designing  robots  to  learn  by  doing  and
understanding through trial and errors, to discover causal rules as if they were little scientists, which
is proposed that  infants do (Gopnik et al., 2000, Meltzoff, 2007, Tenenbaum, 2011). Following
Richard Feynman’s quote ’I cannot understand what I cannot create’, the principle of enaction, the
organization of knowledge through action, is a necessary choice to have robots that can learn by
doing.
In this sense, we can say that Bayesian-based algorithms are one instance of Explanatory Learning
Algorithms.  Since  current  hypothesis  can  be  evaluated  and expressed  to  the  user,  this  type  of
learning is different from black-box learning algorithms in which the internals state is not accessible
to users. Bayesian processes permit to qualify uncertainties by estimating quantitatively what is
unexpected or unpredictable. Certain AI architectures are properly designed to infer hidden causes
like Boltzmann machines, auto-encoders or the Bayesian Networks and new implementations have
been proposed for reverse-engineering like the generative adversarial networks (Goodfellows et al.,
2014), or some implementations of predictive coding (Spratling, 2016).
By inferring the hidden causes of the current state of the robot, predictive coding and the Bayesian
framework can serve to design for tracing back robot decisions. This has a drawback, to let the
robot to act and perhaps to fail in certain situations by testing different hypothesis. It is only at this
price that predictive coding algorithms can promote open access to robots cognitive architecture,
which can serve for a better understanding of the robot’s internal state and a better control by a user.
A Science  of  Learning –  In  a  seminal  paper,  some  developmental  scientists  advocated  for  a
“foundations of a new Science of Learning” that would be on the frontiers of eduction, medical,
cognitive sciences and machine learning (Meltzoff & al., 2009). 
As a mirror of ourselves, having robots that can learn incrementally from us some hypothesis about
the world, under uncertainty and noise, through trial and errors, may serve us to figure out about our
own errors and failures, as well as the biases we human unconsciously introduce and propagate. 
This approach, more horizontal about the capabilities of robots and more open-ended about their
interactions in their environment, might be less effective than current algorithms specialized in one
specific task only. At reverse, they may generalize more easily and be more interesting to use in
terms of novelty and co-construction with a partner. On the long run, we speculate that curiosity-
driven algorithms for life-long learning in autonomous machines may have some beneficial effects
also on people interacting with to improve their learning capabilities either for cognitive tasks or for
sport practices, and not only to infants or to the ederly persons. We think that the complexity and
adaptiveness of autonomous robots is at this price. 
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